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Abstract
Land is an essential input into agricultural production. A grwoing literature is
concerned with the factors influencing farmers’ land market participation decisions in
developing countries, with developed countries largely ignored. Current best-practise
in the land market participation literature is exemplified by Holden et al. (2007) who
use a dynamic model which allows for state-dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity. Much of the literature fails to adequately deal with these features of
land market decisions. In addition, a single model is used to represent all farm types.
In this paper, we firstly consider the factors influencing land market participation
decisions in a developing country, Ireland, while allowing for state-dependence,
unobserved heterogeneity and differences across farm tyes. We compare these results
to those that are obtained while ignoring state-dependence, unobserved heterogeneity
and differences between farm types. Our results suggest that some caution may be
warranted when these aspects are ignored when if fact they are present.
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1 Introduction
While there is an extensive literature concerned with the price that farmers are willing
to pay for agricultural land, ranging from time-series analyses to the use of hedonic
models, less work has been carried out on other land market decisions, such as
farmers’ decisions whether to participate in land rental markets or how much land to
rent-in. Recent work concerned with farmers’ land market participation decisions has
focused on developing countries. Authors such as Skoufias (1995) have considered
land market participation to be a response to imperfect markets for other inputs in the
production process - such as bullocks and family labour in a developing country. This
paper applies a similar model to farmers’ land market decisions in a developed
country, namely Ireland. However, the primary focus of the paper is on the adequacy
of the econometric models commonly used in the existing literature.
In addition to being influenced by observable factors such as the use of non-land
inputs, farmers’ land market participation decisions may depend on a plethora of
unobservable (to the econometrician at least) factors such as the farmers ability, the
existence of contiguous plots of land and the farmers attitude towards lands market
participation. Such factors are referred to as unobserved heterogeneity. In the existing
participation literature, datasets with repeated observations of the same farm are rarely
utilised, meaning that much unobserved farm heterogeneity cannot be taken account
of.i
Thus there is an implicit assumption in much of the literature that this unobserved
heterogeneity does not impact on estimates of the influence of factors affecting land
market participation decisions. Wooldridge (2002) has shown that if the unobserved
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the X variables then Average Partial Effects are
consistently estimated even if this heterogeity is ignored. However when the
neglected heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables estimated average
partial effects are no longer consistent. Thus in much of the existing literature,
presented estimates may not be consistent.ii Where farm-level panel data has been
used, (Yao (2000); Holden, Deininger and Ghebru (2007); Ballesteros and Bresciani
(2008)), results suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is present implying that such
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concerns are not mute. One aspect of our paper compares estimates of average partial
effects obtained using models that incorporate unobserved heterogeneity to those
obtained using models that do not.
There are also likely to be considerable costs relating to initial participation in
land markets, such as search and contracting costs. Thus farmers that have already
undertaken these activities in previous periods, may face lower costs of participation
in the current period and so are more likely to participate again in the current period
than an otherwise identical farmer that has not previously participated. This
phenomenon is known as state-dependence and it may be modelled using a dynamic
model. The existence of state-dependence in Irish farmers’ participation decisions is
strongly suggested by the fact that only approximately 5% of farms alter their
decision whether to rent-in land in any given year. Although less dramatic, the area
transacted in any year also displays considerable inertia.
It is not sufficient however to include a lagged dependent variable to capture this
inertia as, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the ’initial conditions
problem’ is encountered, requiring the use of a different estimator.iii However, with
one exception that we are aware of, such methods have not been employed in the
literature to date,iv with the result that state-dependence is routinely ignored. This
paper considers the impact of ignoring state-dependence and of failing to take account
of the ‘initial conditions’ problem. While ignoring unobserved heterogeneity and
state-dependence is undesirable from a theoretical perspective, it is often necessitated
by the absence of panel data across time in many developing countries. Thus it is
important to ascertain the magnitude of likely biases that can result when state-
dependence is ignored when modelling farmers’ land market decisions.
In Ireland, the National Farm Survey, which is conducted each year by Teagasc
(the Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority), allows the construction of a
panel dataset to take account of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in a
similar manner to that of Holden, et al. (2007). The significance of the terms
capturing state-dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in the results of Holden, et
al. (2007) suggest that the Wooldridge estimator is to be preferred when modelling
farmers’ land market decisions. However, since they do not include results obtained
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from models that ignore state-dependence or unobserved heterogeneity, the magnitude
of bias in studies which ignore these considerations is unclear. In light of the number
of studies which ignore these considerations, we feel this is an unfortunate omission.
In this paper, we explore the importance of incorporating unobserved heterogeneity
and state-dependence in models of farmers’ land market participation decisions by
comparing Average Partial Effects obtained from models estimated using the
Wooldridge estimator to those obtained when unobserved heterogeneity and/or state-
dependence are ignored.
A further notable feature of the literature is the use of a single model to represent
all farm enterprises. If farmers’ in these countries are fairly homogenous in terms of
their actions perhaps this is of little concern. However if farms are engaged in one of a
number of possible distinct activities, it is reasonable to expect that differences may
exist in the determinants of farms land market participation decisions across these
activities. For example, for some farm enterprises land and labour may be
complementary inputs in production, while in others they may be substitutes. To the
extent that farmers engage in differing activities in developing countries and that
differences in land market participation decisions exist across farm types, the
estimates contained in the existing literature may prove somewhat unreliable.
In the National Farm Survey, farms are classified as belonging to one of six farm
’systems’ based on the EU farm typology as set out in Commission Decision 78/463
and its subsequent amendments. Farms are categorized into the following systems:
dairying, dairying and other activities, cattle-rearing, cattle and other activities,
mainly sheep and tillage. Since we observe each farms system we can explore
differences in the impact of influential variables across farm systems to assess
whether the use of a single model for all farm types in the existing literature is likely
to provide misleading estimates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
brief theoretical model to give some context to the results, Section 3 discusses the
data, and Section 4 considers the econometric methodology and discusses the
statistical issues outlined above in more detail. Section 5 presents the results and
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Model
According to Skoufias (1995), in a developing country, land transactions can be
viewed as an attempt by farmers to adjust the area that they cultivate in response to
their endowments of non-land inputs such as family labour and bullocks, which are
not easily tradable due to market imperfections, in order to reach an optimal input
mix.v Farmers may face market imperfections such as transaction costs or the absence
of markets which hinder the direct adjustment of non-land inputs. An example of
transaction costs typically cited in the literature (such as Skoufias (1995)) is the
supervision costs associated with hired labour which make family and hired labour
imperfect substitutes (under the assumption that family labour is less likely to
withhold effort).
In the presence of market imperfections, farmers may alter their cultivated area to
match their endowments of other inputs, rather than change their use of non-land
inputs. If this were the case, households with a greater number of bullocks and
availability of family labour would be expected to rent-in land so as to operate using a
factor input-mix closer to their optimum. Other transaction costs include those
relating to searching for tenants/land and draughting of contracts may represent
barriers to participation in the land market. Skoufias assumes that, based on their
initial non-land endowments of draft animals (B) and family labour (F), each farm has
an optimal area they wish to farm - the desired cultivated area (DCA). Farms will
participate in the land market to adjust their initial endowment of land to this level.
Thus farms wish to transact an area of:
Y*=DCA−Ȳ=f(B,F)−Land (1)
However in the presence of transaction costs, farms will not transact this area but
rather some function of the desired level, Y=h(Y*). The observed land market activity,
Y, is approximated using a first order Taylor-series expansion which gives:
Y=(h'fB)B+(h'fF)F−(h')Ȳ+A (2)
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where h'=
dh
Y*
and A is a constant. Equation 2 provides the basis for the econometric
model used by Skoufias when looking at the extent of participation. We may also
view this model as driving decisions whether to participate in the land market.
Although in a developed country such as Ireland, one would expect that market
imperfections are not as prevalent as in developing countries, in rural communities it
is not hard to imagine family labour being imperfectly tradable due to barriers such as
commuting costs for off-farm jobs and children below the legal working age
contributing to the farm enterprise. Other authors have derived their econometric
models directly from profit maximising behaviour. However the resultant econometric
model takes a similar form to that implied by Skoufias model. Since we are focussed
on the adequacy of the econometric models, this simpler theoretical model suffices to
give some context to our treatment of farmers’ decisions. We next discuss the data
used in this paper.
3 Data
Each year, the Irish National Farm Survey (NFS) of approximately 1,200 Irish
farmers is conducted by Teagasc (the Irish Agriculture and Food Development
Authority).vi The survey data is nationally representative of Irish dairy, cattle and
sheep farmers. In this paper we construct a panel of Irish farmers using NFS data for
the years from 2000 to 2008 inclusive. In total there are 10,513 observations relating
to 2,129 different farms, with approximately 1/4 of the farms being present for all
nine years. To counteract the effects of influential observations, farms that reported
values in the upper and lower 1% of observations for key variables for any year were
excluded from the study. The final working sample consisted of 8,741 observations.
We focus on two decisions facing Irish farmers; firstly whether to participate in
the land rental market and secondly, how much land, if any, to rent-in. The dependent
variable for land market participation, Renting, is a binary variable equal to one if the
farmer rents-in land in the current year and zero otherwise. When considering the
extent of participation, the dependent variable, Conacre rented, equals the area of
land rented-in under the ‘conacre’ system in the current year.vii The dependent
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variable for conacre rented is censored from below at zero. The same explanatory
variables are used for both models and are similar to those that commonly appear in
the existing literature.
Older farmers may not wish to farm as actively as younger farmers and hence
may rent-in less land than younger farmers (Teklu and Lemi (2004); Holden and
Ghebru (2005); Noev (2008). To capture this effect we include the age of the head of
household in quadratic form, (Age and Age2). Farmers that have an off-farm job may
have less time to devote to agriculture and so may also rent-in less land than those
without off-farm jobs (Kung (2002); Holden and Ghebru (2005)). On the other hand,
income from off-farm jobs may serve to relax credit constraints so the effect is
somewhat ambiguous. We include a dummy variable which equals one if the head of
householdviii has an off-farm job and zero otherwise (Job).
Farmers who have access to a large number of units of paid labour, (Paid labour)
and unpaid labour, (unpaid labour) may be anticipated to rent-in more (less) land if
land and labour are complements (substitutes) (Skoufias (1995); Deininger and Jin
(2002); Tikabo, Holden and Bergland (2007)). The log of machinery operating costs
is included to capture the use of machinery on the farm, (Machinery). The farmer’s
endowment of land will influence whether the farmer participates in the land market.
Farmers with large initial land endowments, (Area owned), are expected to rent-in less
land than those with small endowments (Deininger and Jin (2002); Vranken and
Swinnen (2006); Ballesteros and Bresciani (2008); Jin and Deininger (2009)), though
ownership of land may also relax credit constraints through the greater collateral it
represents.
Since farmers with poor land quality may compensate for this by renting-in extra
land, a series of dummy variables are included to capture soil quality, (Soil1=best to
Soil5=worst). Teklu and Lemi (2004) find that land with greater erosion is more
likely to be rented out, while Falkowski (2005) finds that farms with lower quality
land are more likely to rent-in land, (possibly to offset its lower productivity).
RERC Working Paper Series PUT 10-WP-RE-05
For More Information on the RERC Working Paper Series
Email: cathal.odonoghue@teagasc.ie, Web: www.tnet.teagasc.ie/rerc/
9
Farmers’ with a large number of livestock are likely to need more land for
grazing etc. so a variable representing the number of livestock units is also included,
(Dairy units, Cattle units and Sheep units). The impact of a recent policy change is
captured by the inclusion of a dummy variable which equals zero in the years prior to
the policy change (2000-2004 inclusive) and is equal to one from the year 2005
onwards, (Dummy decoupling). The effects of decoupling on farmers’ land market
participation decisions are the focus of O’Neill and Hanrahan (2010). Table 1 displays
summary statistics for binary and scale variables respectively.
4 Econometric methodology
In much of the literature previously discussed, the decision whether to participate in
the land rental market is modelled as a binary choice, with farms choosing between
renting-in or not renting-in land.ix The extent of participation is then modelled using a
censored model such as tobit, which is a standard approach in much of the literature.
In this section, we briefly review the probit and tobit models before discussing the
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity and state-dependence both in the existing
literature and in this paper.
We can think of the decision to participate in the land market as depending on an
unobserved latent variable, Y*it, which is a function of observed individual
characteristics, Xit and a random component, εit. Participation occurs if the latent
variable takes a value greater than zero. In the absence of unobserved individual
heterogeneity and state-dependence, the latent model can be written as:
Y*it=Xitβ+ε
*
it (3)
and the observed participation decision, Yit, is given by
x:
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Yit=



 1;if Y*it>0;
0;if Y*it≤0.
(4)
A similar latent variable framework, albeit possibly with different coefficients, may
be viewed as underlying the tobit model with Equation 4 being replaced by Equation
5 below:
Yit=



 Y*it;if Y
*
it>0;
0; if Y*it≤0.
(5)
In addition to their observed characteristics, Xit, farmers’ land market participation
decisions are likely to depend on some factors which are not observed by the
econometrician, such as the farmers’ abilities. Also, in Ireland, it is not uncommon for
farmers to own multiple plots, with the result that often farmers will rent an
intervening plot in order to improve the farmer’s ease of access to their land. Such
unobserved factors that influence farmers’ land market decisions are termed
unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
In a cross-section setting, the impact of these unobserved factors will increase the
variance of the error term and lead to attenuation bias in coefficient estimates.
However, as discussed in Wooldridge (2002: p470-471), Average Partial Effects
(APE) will be consistently estimated as long as the unobserved heterogeneity is not
correlated with the included explanatory variables. Unfortunately this is unlikely to be
the case in general as unobserved factors such as the farmers’ abilities and their
attitudes to farming are like to be correlated with the included variables, such as the
farmers’ endowment of land and use of other inputs. Thus estimates of APEs are
likely to be inconsistent if unobserved heterogeneity is neglected.
To some extent this can be mitigated if the unobserved factors differ across
regions rather than across farmsxi through the inclusion of regional dummy
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variables.xii However, where the unobserved heterogeneity is at an individual farm
level, as is likely to be the case when considering farmers’ land market decisions, the
inclusion of regional dummies is not sufficient to avoid inconsistent estimates. Panel
data methods allow us to take account of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
through the inclusion of individual-level effects.
 We can decompose the error term, εit into two components; an unobserved
individual specific effectxiii, μi and a component, νit which is assumed to be identically
and independently distributed (iid) over time and individuals. Thus Equation 3
becomes:
Y*it=Xitβ+μi+νit (6)
If we were to just ignore the unobserved heterogeneity, μi and pool the observations,
the time-invariant unobserved individual effect would be correlated with itself over
time (attenuation bias discussed previously would also be an issue). Thus explicitly
considering the unobserved individual effect should lead to superior inferences than
the use of cross-section or pooled models. Although many of the papers in the
literature include dummy variables representing regions, allowing some unobserved
heterogeneity to be captured, only those by Yao (2000), Holden, Deininger and
Ghebru (2007) and Ballesteros and Bresciani (2008) control for farm-level
heterogeneity. This may be partly explained by the difficulty of obtaining farm-level
panel data in developing countries. Fortunately this is not an issue in Ireland. We next
discuss methods of incorporating unobserved heterogeneity.
 If we believe that μi is correlated with our explanatory variables, we should use a
fixed effects estimator. However the incidental parameters problem arises whereby
parameter estimates are inconsistent and suffer from a small sample bias.xiv Whilst
this provides little challenge in a linear setting, in a non-linear setting, we must find a
statistic to condition on which removes μi from the likelihood to overcome the
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incidental parameters problem.xv No such statistic exists for the probit and tobit
models. Generally a fixed effect logit estimator is used. However a drawback of the
fixed effect logit is that only observations which exhibit a change in the dependent
variable for the current period contribute identifying information. Thus, in the context
of this paper, only farms which have altered their participation decision during the
period are useful. This is an unattractive feature when analyzing a panel dataset where
the dependent variable displays a high degree of inertia, as is the case here.
 If on the other hand, we do not believe that μi is correlated with our explanatory
variables, then we may use a random effects estimator.xvi However, the assumption
that unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated with all of the other explanatory
variables seems unrealistic. Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) relax this
assumption, allowing for a correlated random effect. This involves specifying that the
unobserved effect for individual i is partially dependent on a function of Xit such as
the average, iX , so that itii X   . Since the Mundlak approach allows us to take
account of correlation between unobserved farm heterogeneity and farm
characteristics, this approach is used throughout the paper. We now discuss the
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in the literature.
Yao (2000) estimates a fixed effects logit model for farmers’ decision whether to
participate in land rental markets in Chinaxvii, finding that individual heterogeneity is
present. The results from the fixed effects model differ in terms of significance from
those obtained using a pooled logit model, supporting our contention that it is
important to take account of individual unobserved heterogeneity when considering
farmers’ land market decisions.
Holden et al. (2007) incorporate individual effects through the use of Mundlak
terms and a random effects estimator. The Mundlak terms are significant in these
results suggesting firstly that unobserved heterogeneity is present and secondly that
the use of a random effect would be incorrect. Ballesteros and Bresciani (2008)
incorporate random effects in their probit and tobit models. However unlike Holden et
al., they do not appear to allow for correlation between the individual effects and
other explanatory variables.
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Thus the work by Holden et al. appears to be the only paper which adequately
incorporates unobserved heterogeneity into models for both the ’participation
decision’ and for the ’extent of participation’ decision. Since unobserved
heterogeneity is found in all of the studies which have tried to incorporate it, some
caution is probably advisable when considering the results of studies which have not
done so. Holden et al. do not include results using random effects or ignoring
unobserved heterogeneity, so the practical import of an incorrect assumption
regarding the unobserved heterogeneity is unclear. To assess the importance of taking
account of unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate pooled probit and tobit models and
compare these estimates to those obtained using a random effects estimator excluding,
and then including Mundlak terms.
We next discuss the treatment of state-dependence in this paper and in the
existing literature.
4.2 State-dependence
Past participation in the land rental market may influence a farmer’s decision whether
to participate in the land rental market again in the current period if participation in
the previous period has altered his preferences or the prices and constraints that he
faces. For example if a farmer has undertaken search or contracting costs in the
previous period, these may be lower in subsequent periods. This phenomenon is
known as state-dependence.
However, suppose that a farmer rented-in land in the initial period due to the
influence of some unobserved heterogeneity such as the need to access a second plot
of land. In subsequent periods, the farmer may again rent-in land to gain access the
second plot. To the econometrician it would (incorrectly) appear that past
participation had influenced the current decision, whereas in fact the current decision
is caused by the unobserved existence of multiple plots). Such apparent state-
dependence is thus spurious. Thus spurious state dependence is closely linked to the
issue of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
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From the above examples it should be clear that when examining the existence of
state-dependence, care must be taken to control for the impact of individual
heterogeneity. If there were no unobserved individual heterogeneity we could simply
include a lagged dependent variable to capture the state-dependence. However in the
presence of such heterogeneity an issue known as the "initial conditions problem"
arises. The problem is caused by correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
and the lagged dependent variable.xviii This violates the strict exogeneity assumption
with the result that state-dependence is overestimated, while the short run effects of
the other explanatory variables are underestimated (Heckman, 1981a).
Approaches to deal with the initial conditions problem have been suggested by
Heckman (1981a,1981b), Orme (1997, 2001) and Wooldridge (2005) in a random
effects framework.xix Arulampalam and Stewart (2008) compare the methods of
Heckman, Orme and Wooldridge, using a Monte-Carlo study for a panel of 3,000
observations (with n=500, T=6) and find that they provide similar results. Recent
results from Monte Carlo experiments by Akay (2009) suggest that for panels of
duration less than 5 years, Heckman’s approach is superior to that of Wooldridge,
while for panels from 5 to 8 years in duration the two methods tend to give similar
results, with Wooldridge’s approach being superior for longer panels.
State-dependence is routinely ignored in the literature. Deininger and Jin (2002)
and Holden and Ghebru (2005) include a lagged dependent variable in their models in
recognition of the effect that past decisions may have on current decisions. However,
these results may be somewhat unreliable if unobserved heterogeneity is present due
to the ’initial conditions problem’. Holden et al. (2007) appears to be the only work
which fully incorporates state-dependence through the use of an estimator which takes
account of the initial conditions problem. However, since Holden et al. do not present
results from models that ignore state-dependence, it is not possible to assess the
empirical importance of correctly accounting for state-dependence in land market
participation decisions.xx
We next briefly outline the Wooldridge estimator which takes account of
unobserved heterogeneity, state dependence and the initial conditions problem.
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4.2.1 Wooldridge Estimator
Wooldridge assumes that the distribution of the unobserved component, μ, is 
conditional on the initial condition, Yi0, and the exogenous explanatory variables.
Where previously we decomposed the error term, ε into two components, μi and νit,
Wooldridge suggests that we additionally specify μi as:
 μi=α0+α1yi0+ziα2+ai (7)
Thus Wooldridge specifies the latent variable model as:
Y*it=zitβ+Ȳyi,t−1+α0+α1yi0+ziα2+ai+νit (8)
An attractive feature of this approach is that the model above may be estimated using
standard random effects probit/tobit where the regressors are xit=[1,zit,yi,t−1,yi0,zi]
. In practice, this estimator requires less computational time than the implementation
of the Heckman approach by Stewart2006 and tends to converge more quickly also.
This fact, in conjunction with the simulation results of Akay, leads us to use the
Wooldridge estimator over the Heckman estimator. The Wooldridge estimator allows
us to test whether the initial conditions problem arises via a simple t-test on the
coefficient of the initial condition α1. The joint significance of the Mundlak terms can
be tested through the use of an F-test on the Mundlak coefficients α2.
Table 2 summarises the models used in the literature. The last two columns show
whether the authors incorporated individual effects to capture unobserved
heterogeneity and whether a dynamic model is used to capture state-dependence.
4.3 Difference across farm types
Within the NFS dataset, farms are categorized as being engaged in one of six systems
based on the EU farm typology as set out in Commission Decision 78/463 and its
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subsequent amendments. These systems are dairying, dairying and other activities,
cattle-rearing, cattle-rearing and other activities, mainly sheep and tillage. The factors
influencing farmer’s land market participation, and their impacts, may differ across
farm types. In the literature, a single model is estimated to represent all farms. If the
factors influencing farmers’ land market participation decisions differ across farm
types or if the impact of the factors differs then the estimated coefficients will not
provide a good representation of the actual impacts of the factors influencing a
farmer’s decision. If there are shocks which are specific to some of the farm activities,
for example the outbreak of a disease such as foot and mouth, then pooling farms in
different systems will also lead to autocorrelation, further compromising the
reliability of estimates.
One manner in which differences between systems could be accommodated
would be to interact dummy variables representing each system with the other
explanatory variables. However, Ai and Norton (2003) show that, in a non-linear
setting, the sign, magnitude and significance of interaction terms may all be
unreliable. While Ai and Norton also present a method for taking account of this
issue, in the probit model, the scale of the error term is not identified in some cases. In
the tobit model information is available regarding the scale of Y*it. So this is not a
concern. However such information is unavailable when we are dealing with a binary
dependent variable as in the probit model (since Yit depends only on the sign of Y
*
it).
Thus in the probit model the variance of ε
*
it is unidentified. Rewriting the error term ε
*
it
, as a normally distributed error term with variance unity, εit, scaled by a parameter,
σ
ε
*, we may rewrite equation 3 as:
Y*it=
Xitβ
σ
ε
*
+
ε
*
it
σ
ε
*
=Xitγ+εit (9)
Therefore, in the probit model, the parameter of interest is confounded with the
variance of the error term. Thus the vector of coefficients which we estimate is γ 
rather than the parameter of interest β. In many cases this is relatively unimportant. 
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However, when comparing probit coefficients across groups it is necessary that the
scale of the variance is the same for each group in order for the comparison to be
valid (Allison (1999)).
While it is tempting to assume that only large differences in the variances matter,
Monte Carlo simulations performed by Hoetker (2004) indicate that even small
differences in residual variation can invalidate cross-group comparisons.xxi Williams
(2009) suggests that using a heterogeneous choice model may be more appropriate,
though Keele and Park (2006) suggest that if the variance equation is mis-specified,
results may be even more biased than if the heteroskedasticity is ignored. Since these
issues do not arise for the tobit model as σ
ε
* is identified, the approach taken here is to
estimate the models separately for each system, avoiding the use of interaction terms
and to confine comparisons between groups to the tobit results.
While in a linear model, the marginal effect of Xi on Y is given by the coefficient,
β, in a non-linear models, the marginal effect of Xi ,
∂E(Y|X)
∂Xi
, depends on the value of
Xβ at which it is evaluated. However, when using non-linear models with panel data, 
the marginal effect will also depend on the value of the unobserved heterogeneity, μi.
Wooldridge suggests using the Average Partial Effect, which consists of averaging the
partial effect across the distribution of μi as opposed to calculating partial effects at
some particular value of μi. The calculation of APEs and their standard errors is
discussed in Mentzakis and Moro (2007).
5 Results
We now turn to the results obtained from the various model estimations. We begin by
considering the results for the Wooldridge estimator, applied to the probit
(participation) and tobit (extent of participation) models, contained in Tables 3 and 4
respectively. Due to the ease of interpretation and space limitations, we only present
the Average Partial Effects.xxii The second column of each of these tables presents the
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results when all farm systems are pooled together - as is the case in the existing
literature. The APEs for ’lagged renting’ and ’lagged area rented’ are highly
statistically significant, showing that state-dependence is present. These effects are
very large suggesting that ignoring state-dependence is likely to greatly overstate the
short-run effects of the other explanatory variables. The initial conditions in these
models are also highly significant (Initially renting/Initial area rented). Thus if the
initial conditions problem were ignored and just a simple dynamic model estimated,
state-dependence would be overestimated while the effects of the other explanatory
variables would be underestimated. The significance of some of the Mundlak terms
suggests that the use of a standard random effects estimator to treat unobserved
heterogeneity would also be incorrect, as the unobserved effect would be correlated
with the explanatory variables (violating the exogeneity assumption underlying
random effects).
We next explored whether the use of a single set of parameters for all farm
systems is warranted. The remaining columns of Tables 3 and 4 present the results
when the model is ran separately for each of the six farm types. It is clear that the
significance and magnitudes of the explanatory variables differ across farm types and
from the model representing all farm types. Consider, for example, the effect of an
off-farm job on farmers land market decisions. Using the pooled model, the average
partial effects suggest that having an off-farm job has no effect on the probability of
renting-in land nor on the area rented-in. However when we estimate the models
separately we can see that having a job does affect the probability of renting-in land
and the area rented-in for some farm systems. Thus it is clear that pooling farm
systems can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the effects of explanatory
variables. To test whether these differences are statistically significant, a likelihood
ratio test comparing the likelihood for the pooled model to the sum of the likelihoods
from the separate models is carried out and confirms that the individual models are
preferable to the pooled model. This suggests that the prevalent use of a single model
to represent all farm types in the existing literature may also give cause for some
concern unless there truly aren’t differences across farm types in these countries.
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In light of the number of studies which have ignored the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity and/or state-dependence, we next compare the results obtained using
the Wooldridge estimator to those obtained from models where these features of
farmers’ decisions are ignored. If the estimated effects do not greatly differ from the
Wooldridge results then perhaps the deficiencies in the existing literature are not too
severe. We focus here on specialist dairying farmers due to space limitations.xxiii.
Specialist dairying farmers are the largest category with 2,536 farms engaged in this
activity in the final sample.
Although Table 5 presents the coefficients from the various modelsxxiv, we focus
instead on Table 6 which reports the Average Partial Effects for the tobit models as
the basis for our comparisons.xxv The use of a pooled model (Column 2), ignoring
state-dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, greatly overstates the average partial
effects of the explanatory variables when compared to the short-run estimates
obtained from the Wooldridge estimator and would also lead us to, erroneously,
conclude that having an off-farm job has no effect on the area the farmer chooses to
rent-in. The inclusion of random effects (Column 3) to capture the unobserved
heterogeneity reduces the overstated estimates and also shows that having an off-farm
job does influence land rental decisions. However, as mentioned previously, in order
for the random effects results to be valid the unobserved heterogeneity must be
exogenous. The inclusion of Mundlak terms (Column 4) shows that this requirement
is violated here. However, although the use of Mundlak terms does alter the estimated
APEs, the magnitude of these changes is relatively small suggesting that, in this case,
endogeneity of the individual effects is not a great concern. The farmers’ ages and the
number of unpaid labour units appear to significantly influence farmers’ decisions,
however when state-dependence is controlled for (Column 6) we see that this is nt
actually the case. Although the significance of individual Mundlak terms differs
across the final three models (Columns 4-6), there is always strong evidence that the
assumption of an exogenous random effect is violated.
If we depart form the Wooldridge model (Column 6) by ignoring the initial
conditions problem caused by correlation between the lagged dependent variable and
the unobserved heterogeneity, and estimate a simple dynamic model (Column 5) we
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see that the effect of the lagged dependent variable is overstated by almost a third (i.e.
0.4173/0.321). Having an off-farm job is no longer found to have a statistically
significant effect at the 10% level (though it is at the 16%), while the effect of
Machinery operating costs are now significant at the 10% level. Some APEs, such as
those for the number of dairy units and the number of cattle units, are understated. We
also see that there are changes in the significance of the average partial effects for the
soil dummies and the decoupling dummy variables.
Thus we can see that the Average Partial Effects are influenced by the
assumptions regarding the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and state-
dependence. Models which ignore these aspects of farmers’ decision making may lead
to erroneous conclusions regarding the variables that are driving these decisions and
the magnitudes of their influences. The routine use of the Wooldridge estimator is to
be encouraged since it allows us to ascertain whether state-dependence or unobserved
heterogeneity are influencing our results.
6 Conclusions
As land is an essential input into agricultural production, it is somewhat surprising
that the factors influencing farmers’ land market participation decisions in developed
countries has been largely ignored. Land market participation decisions of farmers in
developing countries have received more attention. However, possibly due to data
limitations in these countries, models which make use of panel data methods have
been relatively rare. Few papers have controlled for unobserved differences between
farms, while serious deficiencies exist in the treatment of state-dependence in much of
the literature. Current best-practise in the land market participation literature is
exemplified by Holden et al. (2007). They account for unobserved heterogeneity and
state-dependence through the use of an estimator suggested by Wooldridge (2005).
However, although their results show that state-dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity are important features to incorporate, they do not explore the effects of
ignoring either. In light of the number of studies which ignore these features we
compare results obtained using this model to those obtained from models where
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unobserved heterogeneity is not modelled and where state-dependence is ignored or
incorrectly treated due to presence of unobserved heterogeneity. An additional feature
of the literature to date has been the implicit assumption that differences between
farms engaged in various enterprises do not warrant separate estimates. This
assumption is tested in this paper by estimating separate models for each farm type
and comparing the resulting estimates to those obtained when all farm systems are
pooled in a single model.
Our results suggest that the use of a single model to represent disparate farms
may lead to misleading estimates and incorrect inferences. Similarly, if the initial
conditions problem is not controlled for, state dependence is overestimated (by
approximately a third in this case) while other estimates also prove unreliable.
Similarly, if unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for, and correlation between
the unobserved heterogeneity and the other explanatory variable accounted for, then
estimates again prove unreliable. Thus results in much of the literature may prove to
be unreliable if re-examined using the Wooldridge estimator as advocated by Holden
et al. (2007) and estimating separate models where differences exist between farm
enterprises as advocated here.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables
Binary Variables No. of obs. Percentage of 1’s
Renting 8741 51.36
Job 8741 28.64
Soil class 1 (Best) 8741 33.44
Soil class 2 8741 17.93
Soil class 3 8741 19.11
Soil class 4 8741 20.55
Soil class 5 (Worst) 8741 8.97
Dummy decoupling 8741 43.63
Scale Variables No. non-zero obs. Mean Std. dev.
Conacre rented 4489 42.52 53.81
Age 8741 51.74 12.16
Area owned 8695 108.54 75.14
Paid labour 3317 0.31 0.46
Unpaid labour 8721 1.19 0.48
Machinery 8554 46.74 52.84
Dairy units 3453 49.45 22.63
Cattle units 8235 40.86 27.74
Sheep units 2944 24.56 25.52
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Table 2: Overview of selected papers concerned with land market participation
Year Author Country Participation Extent of
Participation
Individual
Effects
Static/Dynamic
1995 Skoufias India N/A Tobit No Static
2000 Yao China Logit Yes Static
2002 Deininger and Jin China Probit Tobit No Lagged Dependent
2002 Kung China N/A Tobit No Static
2003 Deininger, Jin, Demeke, Adenew and
Gebre-Selassie
Ethiopia Probit Tobit No Static
2004 Teklu and Lemi Ethiopia Probit Heckman 2-stage No Static
2004 Deininger, Castagnini and Gonzalez Colombia Probit Tobit No Static
2005 Falkowski Poland N/A Tobit No Static
2005 Holden and Ghebru Ethiopia Probit Tobit and Craggs
double hurdle
No Lagged dependent
2006 Vranken and Swinnen Hungary N/A Tobit and IV tobit No Static
2007 Holden, Deininger and Ghebru Ethiopia Probit Tobit Yes Lagged dependent
and initial condition
2007 Deininger, Carletto and Savastano Albania Multinomial logit
and ordered probit
N/A No Static
2007 Masterson Paraguay Logit Tobit No Static
2007 Deininger and Jin China Ordered probit N/A No Static
2007 Tikabo, Holden and Bergland Eritrea Multinomial logit Heckman-Lee,
Deaton, OLS and
Tobit
No Static
2008 Noev Bulgaria Probit Heckman 2-stage No Static
2008 Nyangena Kenya N/.A Tobit No Static
2008 Ballesteros and Bresciani Philippines Probit Tobit Yes Static
2008 Deininger and Jin Vietnam Probit and ordered
probit
Tobit No Static
2009 Deininger, Jin and Nagarajan India Ordered probit N/A No Static
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Table 3: APEs for binary participation (probit) models estimated using Wooldridge estimator by farm system
Significance level: ***= 1%, **=5%, *=10%, †=20%,
All Systems Dairying
Dairying and
other
activities
Cattle-
rearing
Cattle-
rearing and
other
activities
Mainly
Sheep
Tillage
Lagged renting 0.4427*** 0.5247*** 0.6191*** 0.6355*** 0.5267*** 0.3788 0.1621†
Initially renting 0.3815*** 0.2982*** 0.1011** 0.1613** 0.2457** 0.4127† 0.5320***
Age 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0063* -0.0001 0.0006 0.0024 -0.0012
Off-farm job -0.0066 -0.0513** 0.0627** 0.0155 -0.0244† -0.0024 -0.0002
Area Owned -0.0022*** -0.0011* -0.0021** -0.0051*** -0.0026*** -0.0021* -0.0014
Unpaid labour 0.0034 0.0179 0.0663 0.0094 -0.0487 0.0483 -0.0698
Paid labour -0.0531** -0.0650* 0.0222 -0.203† -0.1499* 0.1261 -0.0841†
Machinery 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001
Dairy units 0.0014*** 0.0028*** 0.0003 ---- 0.6333 0.0113 -0.0059
Cattle units 0.0023*** 0.0040*** 0.0006 0.0032*** 0.0022*** 0.0008 -0.0002
Sheep units 0.0011† 0.0054† 0.0009 0.0023 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0010
Soil class 2 0.0058 0.0322† 0.0025 -0.0562** -0.0045 -0.0033 0.0533**
Soil class 3 0.0018 0.0071 0.0253 0.0079 0.0097 -0.0197 -0.1342**
Soil class 4 0.0240** 0.0385** 0.0084 0.0220 0.0218 0.0231 -0.3902***
Soil class 5 0.0167 0.0607* 0.0463† 0.0308 -0.0210 -0.0061 ----
Decoupling Dummy 0.0078† 0.0168† -0.0176 0.0063 0.0190* 0.0018 -0.0228
Mundlak: age -0.0012* 0.0015 -0.0073** -0.0003 -0.0025* -0.0044* -0.0004
Mundlak: area owned 0.0018*** 0.0002 0.0009 0.0045*** 0.0020*** 0.0020* 0.0011
Mundlak: unpaid
labour 0.0069 -0.0276 -0.0719 -0.0315 0.0676† -0.0657 0.0674
Mundlak: paid labour 0.0522** 0.0516 0.0177 0.0455 0.1388† -0.4996* 0.1160*
Mundlak: machinery 0.0005*** 0.0005† 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0011 0.0007†
Mundlak: dairy units -0.0014*** -0.0027*** 0.0005 -0.0017 0.0001 0.0032 0.0053
Mundlak: cattle units -0.0017*** -0.0028*** 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0013† -0.0001 0.0008
Mundlak: sheep units -0.0003 -0.0020 0.0001 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006
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Table 4: APEs for extent of participation decision (tobit) models estimated using Wooldridge estimator by farm
system
Significance level: ***= 1%, **=5%, *=10%, †=20%,
All Systems Dairying
Dairying and
other
activities
Cattle-
rearing
Cattle-
rearing and
other
activities
Mainly
Sheep
Tillage
Lagged area rented 0.2498*** 0.3210*** 0.3756*** 0.2530*** 0.2029*** 0.3701*** 0.1640***
Initial area rented 0.2022*** 0.1883*** 0.1910*** 0.1342*** 0.1854*** 0.0869*** 0.2932***
Age -0.0029 -0.0095 0.1133 -0.0420 0.0060 0.0075 -0.0637
Off-farm job -0.4991 -1.5753* 0.0233 0.8733† -1.0603† -2.5225** 2.1590
Area Owned -0.1429*** -0.1654*** -0.2203*** -0.1397*** -0.1951*** -0.0170 -0.2220*
Unpaid labour 0.5943 -0.9028 5.5736*** 0.0611 1.2349 3.6707† -2.3343
Paid labour -0.6171 -1.3459 2.5793 11.5483*** -6.5026** -1.2261 -0.6522
Machinery 0.0080† 0.0138† 0.0004 -0.0218 -0.0069 -0.0636* 0.0383*
Dairy units 0.0929*** 0.1599*** 0.0917† ---- 0.1878 -0.1773 -0.1670
Cattle units 0.1667*** 0.2428*** 0.0640† 0.2160*** 0.1609*** 0.0985 0.1752*
Sheep units 0.0400† 0.0763 0.0640 0.1278† 0.0918 -0.0247 0.1167
Soil class 2 0.5864 1.4572 -1.4924 -1.3404 -0.3657 0.4317 6.5663*
Soil class 3 1.5866** 1.2795 2.9839* 0.6348 1.7863* 0.1869 -2.5650
Soil class 4 2.1138*** 2.2769** 0.0056 1.4699† 1.9455† 3.9613* -15.0088†
Soil class 5 0.8598 3.7348** 5.2699* 0.7602 -0.0072 -1.4546 -
Decoupling Dummy 0.0429 0.9662** -0.8754 0.0323 0.2835 0.9075 -2.9768†
Mundlak: age -0.1151*** -0.0804 -0.1434 0.0124 -0.0967* -0.1484† -0.1361
Mundlak: area owned 0.1070*** 0.0961*** 0.1227*** 0.0944*** 0.1270*** 0.0098 0.1856†
Mundlak: unpaid
labour 0.5317 1.2933 -6.7740*** -0.5085 0.9894 -2.9936 -1.1927
Mundlak: paid labour 0.5288 1.6705 -1.2775 -21.9003*** 6.4200† -11.5269 0.3527
Mundlak: machinery 0.0333*** -0.0094 0.0780*** 0.0736** 0.0177 0.0871** 0.0394
Mundlak: dairy units -0.0730*** -0.1163*** -0.0282 -0.0298 -0.0071 0.1221 0.6133**
Mundlak: cattle units -0.1084*** -0.1258*** 0.0483 -0.1229*** -0.0480† -0.0909 -0.1103
Mundlak: sheep units 0.0007 0.0839 -0.0178 0.0792 -0.0427 0.0269 -0.0244
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Table 5: Comparison of Models for extent of participation decision (tobit) for farmers engaged in dairying system
Pooled Random Effects Mundlak Effects Dynamic Wooldridge
Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value
Lagged area
rented 0.7995 0.0000 0.6275 0.0000
Initial area
rented 0.3680 0.0000
Age 1.3969 0.0030 2.3031 0.0000 2.5747 0.0000 0.3267 0.4480 0.2484 0.5700
Age squared -0.0148 0.0020 -0.0231 0.0000 -0.0242 0.0000 -0.0035 0.4110 -0.0028 0.5170
Off-farm job -0.5603 0.8130 -4.2647 0.0330 -4.4366 0.0270 -2.4579 0.1630 -3.1575 0.0660
Area Owned -0.4912 0.0000 -0.4824 0.0000 -0.4918 0.0000 -0.2846 0.0000 -0.3233 0.0000
Unpaid labour -0.8234 0.6170 3.7552 0.0530 4.3399 0.0580 -2.4424 0.3220 -1.7647 0.4620
Paid labour -2.1258 0.3700 0.5607 0.8070 -0.5944 0.8160 -2.5408 0.3400 -2.6306 0.3100
Machinery 0.0724 0.0010 0.0202 0.2390 0.0017 0.9240 0.0339 0.0700 0.0271 0.1340
Dairy units 0.6687 0.0000 0.5681 0.0000 0.4601 0.0000 0.2706 0.0000 0.3125 0.0000
Cattle units 0.8661 0.0000 0.8427 0.0000 0.7981 0.0000 0.3835 0.0000 0.4747 0.0000
Sheep units 1.6287 0.0000 1.0765 0.0000 0.7112 0.0170 0.1532 0.6000 0.1492 0.5930
Soil class 2 -0.4732 0.8440 -0.2346 0.9620 -1.4977 0.7610 1.7317 0.4890 2.8921 0.2590
Soil class 3 13.6017 0.0000 8.7628 0.0360 10.2899 0.0140 3.9386 0.0590 2.5481 0.2540
Soil class 4 13.6984 0.0000 8.8458 0.0140 10.4094 0.0040 4.9753 0.0060 4.4493 0.0210
Soil class 5 23.4387 0.0000 12.9823 0.0270 16.9599 0.0040 8.5049 0.0060 7.1082 0.0240
Decoupling
Dummy 2.3312 0.1090 3.4208 0.0000 3.4871 0.0000 1.2531 0.1510 1.8878 0.0270
Mundlak: age -0.3489 0.0630 -0.1136 0.4010 -0.1571 0.2500
Mundlak:
area owned -0.0682 0.3000 0.0953 0.0700 0.1878 0.0000
Mundlak:
unpaid labour -2.5288 0.5680 2.2342 0.4770 2.5279 0.4140
Mundlak:
paid labour 0.7817 0.8950 4.2939 0.2620 3.2651 0.4030
Mundlak:
machinery 0.1093 0.0560 -0.0161 0.6230 -0.0184 0.5840
Mundlak:
dairy units 0.2471 0.0410 -0.0823 0.2900 -0.2273 0.0040
Mundlak:
cattle units 0.0678 0.5100 -0.0603 0.3890 -0.2459 0.0000
Mundlak:
sheep units 0.8956 0.0160 0.3533 0.1490 0.1639 0.5200
Constant
-
46.0412 0.0000 -66.0452 0.0000 -63.2229 0.0000 -10.4693 0.3070 -7.7407 0.4750
standard
error
standard
error
standard
error
standard
error
sigma u 31.4553 1.3570 31.2643 1.3418 11.8862 1.0418 12.5426 0.8502
sigma e 31.7334 0.6185 14.4144 0.2972 14.3653 0.2951 13.4437 0.3122 12.8780 0.2905
Rho 0.8265 0.0135 0.8257 0.0135 0.4387 0.0468 0.4868 0.0365
N 2536 2536 2536 2060 2060
Log
likelihood
-
8066.64
80
-
7050.009
5
-
7038.189
9
-
5427.187
8
-
5378.058
3
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Table 6: Comparison of Models for extent of participation decision (tobit) for farmers engaged in dairying system
(Average Partial effects)
Pooled Random Effects Mundlak Effects Dynamic Wooldridge
APE (p-value) APE (p-value) APE (p-value) APE (p-value) APE (p-value)
Lagged
renting 0.4173 0.0000 0.3210 0.0000
Initially
renting 0.1883 0.0000
Age -0.0122 0.6870 0.0314 0.3880 0.1119 0.0210 -0.0032 0.9570 -0.0095 0.8680
Off-farm job -0.2542 0.8120 -1.8263 0.0290 -1.9145 0.0230 -1.2578 0.1550 -1.5753 0.0600
Area Owned -0.2236 0.0000 -0.2121 0.0000 -0.2179 0.0000 -0.1486 0.0000 -0.1654 0.0000
Unpaid labour -0.3749 0.6170 1.6510 0.0530 1.9232 0.0580 -1.2749 0.3220 -0.9028 0.4620
Paid labour -0.9679 0.3690 0.2465 0.8070 -0.2634 0.8160 -1.3263 0.3400 -1.3459 0.3100
Machinery 0.0330 0.0010 0.0089 0.2390 0.0008 0.9240 0.0177 0.0700 0.0138 0.1340
Dairy units 0.3044 0.0000 0.2498 0.0000 0.2039 0.0000 0.1412 0.0000 0.1599 0.0000
Cattle units 0.3943 0.0000 0.3705 0.0000 0.3537 0.0000 0.2002 0.0000 0.2428 0.0000
Sheep units 0.7415 0.0000 0.4733 0.0000 0.3151 0.0170 0.0800 0.6000 0.0763 0.5930
Soil class 2 -0.1923 0.8430 -0.0966 0.9620 -0.6096 0.7600 0.8741 0.4940 1.4572 0.2680
Soil class 3 6.1991 0.0000 3.8673 0.0420 4.5783 0.0190 2.0335 0.0630 1.2795 0.2600
Soil class 4 6.2480 0.0000 3.9065 0.0160 4.6356 0.0050 2.5961 0.0070 2.2769 0.0230
Soil class 5 11.5452 0.0000 5.9181 0.0410 7.9291 0.0100 4.5988 0.0090 3.7348 0.0310
Decoupling
Dummy 1.0648 0.1100 1.5108 0.0000 1.5522 0.0000 0.6543 0.1510 0.9662 0.0270
Mundlak: age -0.1546 0.0630 -0.0593 0.4010 -0.0804 0.2490
Mundlak:
area owned -0.0302 0.3000 0.0497 0.0700 0.0961 0.0000
Mundlak:
unpaid labour -1.1206 0.5680 1.1662 0.4770 1.2933 0.4140
Mundlak:
paid labour 0.3464 0.8950 2.2414 0.2610 1.6705 0.4020
Mundlak:
machinery 0.0485 0.0560 -0.0084 0.6230 -0.0094 0.5840
Mundlak:
dairy units 0.1095 0.0430 -0.0429 0.2900 -0.1163 0.0030
Mundlak:
cattle units 0.0300 0.5090 -0.0315 0.3900 -0.1258 0.0000
Mundlak:
sheep units 0.3969 0.0160 0.1844 0.1490 0.0839 0.5200
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Table 7: Comparison of Models for binary participation decision (probit) for farmers engaged in dairying system
Pooled Random Effects Mundlak Effects Dynamic Wooldridge
Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value
Lagged
renting - - - - - - 3.1449 0.0000 2.3371 0.0000
Initially
renting - - - - - - - - 1.6808 0.0000
Age 0.0239 0.1810 0.3284 0.0010 0.3633 0.0000 -0.0103 0.7650 0.0040 0.9380
Age squared
-
0.0003 0.1310 -0.0032 0.0010 -0.0034 0.0000 -0.0001 0.7860 -0.0002 0.6810
Off-farm job
-
0.1815 0.0460 -0.6983 0.0260 -0.8259 0.0090 -0.3304 0.0350 -0.5763 0.0160
Area Owned
-
0.0138 0.0000 -0.0520 0.0000 -0.0360 0.0000 -0.0068 0.2410 -0.0130 0.0910
Unpaid labour 0.0021 0.9740 0.4574 0.1370 0.4344 0.2160 0.2018 0.4940 0.2103 0.5680
Paid labour
-
0.0814 0.3660 -0.1078 0.7710 -0.5449 0.2000 -0.5717 0.0980 -0.7646 0.0770
Machinery 0.0024 0.0060 0.0007 0.7940 -0.0017 0.5590 0.0014 0.5740 0.0014 0.6340
Dairy units 0.0153 0.0000 0.0596 0.0000 0.0423 0.0000 0.0234 0.0040 0.0330 0.0020
Cattle units 0.0238 0.0000 0.0818 0.0000 0.0746 0.0000 0.0314 0.0000 0.0471 0.0000
Sheep units 0.0578 0.0000 0.2308 0.0000 0.3115 0.0000 0.0410 0.2350 0.0639 0.1970
Soil class 2 0.0632 0.5100 0.5834 0.4360 0.7131 0.3740 0.2107 0.2250 0.3857 0.1810
Soil class 3 0.3093 0.0000 1.1022 0.1230 1.4690 0.0540 0.1117 0.4350 0.0833 0.7280
Soil class 4 0.2513 0.0000 0.8224 0.1560 1.0549 0.0600 0.2381 0.0530 0.4617 0.0310
Soil class 5 0.5163 0.0000 1.4365 0.2780 2.2812 0.0110 0.3864 0.0700 0.7171 0.0530
Decoupling
Dummy 0.0644 0.2560 0.1401 0.3220 0.1368 0.3480 0.1359 0.1840 0.1969 0.1330
Mundlak: age - - - - -0.0574 0.0420 0.0190 0.1360 0.0174 0.3060
Mundlak:
area owned - - - - -0.0422 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0023 0.7730
Mundlak:
unpaid labour - - - - 0.3151 0.6810 -0.3174 0.3260 -0.3241 0.4480
Mundlak:
paid labour - - - - 0.9685 0.2710 0.3431 0.3720 0.6070 0.2460
Mundlak:
machinery - - - - 0.0218 0.0190 0.0031 0.3310 0.0059 0.1800
Mundlak:
dairy units - - - - 0.0326 0.1050 -0.0203 0.0110 -0.0320 0.0040
Mundlak:
cattle units - - - - 0.0332 0.0830 -0.0216 0.0070 -0.0334 0.0020
Mundlak:
sheep units - - - - -0.0338 0.6200 -0.0097 0.7290 -0.0235 0.5590
Constant
-
0.6875 0.1200 -8.1638 0.0010 -7.3861 0.0030 -1.6468 0.0410 -2.2426 0.0770
Standard
error
Standard
error
Standard
error
Standard
error
sigma u 4.2971 0.3755 4.7163 0.3871 0.0008 0.0129 0.8778 0.1978
sigma e
Rho 0.9486 0.0085 0.9570 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.4352 0.1108
N 2536 2536 2536 2060 2060
Log
likelihood
-
1484.7
379
-
763.5425
-
751.5912
-
412.4941
-
399.3031
RERC Working Paper Series PUT 10-WP-RE-05
For More Information on the RERC Working Paper Series
Email: cathal.odonoghue@teagasc.ie, Web: www.tnet.teagasc.ie/rerc/
31
Table 8: Comparison of Models for binary participation decision (probit) for farmers engaged in dairying system
(Average Partial effects)
Pooled Random Effects Mundlak Effects Dynamic Wooldridge
APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value APE p-value
Lagged
renting 0.8491 0.0000 0.5247 0.0000
Initially
renting 0.2982 0.0020
Age
-
0.0009 0.3280 0.0029 0.2130 0.0044 0.0350 -0.0020 0.1090 -0.0014 0.2800
Off-farm job
-
0.0616 0.0480 -0.1107 0.0410 -0.1122 0.0130 -0.0361 0.0440 -0.0513 0.0220
Area Owned
-
0.0046 0.0000 -0.0075 0.0000 -0.0046 0.0000 -0.0007 0.2420 -0.0011 0.0860
Unpaid labour 0.0007 0.9740 0.0658 0.1430 0.0555 0.2160 0.0213 0.4940 0.0179 0.5690
Paid labour
-
0.0273 0.3650 -0.0155 0.7700 -0.0696 0.2000 -0.0605 0.0990 -0.0650 0.0760
Machinery 0.0008 0.0060 0.0001 0.7950 -0.0002 0.5600 0.0001 0.5740 0.0001 0.6340
Dairy units 0.0051 0.0000 0.0086 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0025 0.0040 0.0028 0.0020
Cattle units 0.0080 0.0000 0.0118 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000
Sheep units 0.0194 0.0000 0.0332 0.0000 0.0398 0.0000 0.0043 0.2360 0.0054 0.1910
Soil class 2 0.0215 0.5090 0.0920 0.4180 0.0989 0.3500 0.0223 0.2210 0.0322 0.1750
Soil class 3 0.1030 0.0000 0.1573 0.1070 0.1832 0.0360 0.0119 0.4340 0.0071 0.7280
Soil class 4 0.0842 0.0000 0.1241 0.1500 0.1399 0.0570 0.0252 0.0520 0.0385 0.0270
Soil class 5 0.1670 0.0000 0.1910 0.1620 0.2500 0.0020 0.0408 0.0720 0.0607 0.0590
Decoupling
Dummy 0.0216 0.2560 0.0201 0.3240 0.0174 0.3460 0.0144 0.1850 0.0168 0.1310
Mundlak: age -0.0073 0.0380 0.0020 0.1370 0.0015 0.3060
Mundlak:
area owned -0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.7720
Mundlak:
unpaid labour 0.0402 0.6780 -0.0336 0.3260 -0.0276 0.4510
Mundlak:
paid labour 0.1237 0.2770 0.0363 0.3720 0.0516 0.2430
Mundlak:
machinery 0.0028 0.0210 0.0003 0.3310 0.0005 0.1790
Mundlak:
dairy units 0.0042 0.1020 -0.0021 0.0120 -0.0027 0.0040
Mundlak:
cattle units 0.0042 0.0990 -0.0023 0.0070 -0.0028 0.0010
Mundlak:
sheep units -0.0043 0.6190 -0.0010 0.7290 -0.0020 0.5580
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i Some heterogeneity may be controlled for by allowing for regional heterogeneity. However where differences
of the unobserved factors exist at the farm level this is insufficient.
ii In fact most of the papers in the literature report coefficients rather than average partial effects, meaning that
their estimates also suffer from attentuation bias.
iii The initial conditions problem is discussed later in this paper.
iv Holden, Deinginger and Ghebru (2007) being the exception.
v For example, if the farm has a bullock but does not have enough land to maximize the return from it, there
may be an incentive to rent-out the bullock, however if such markets are imperfect it may be preferable to
rent-in land instead.
vi The NFS is part of the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of the European Union (EU).
vii The vast majority of renting in Ireland is carried out under the ‘conacre’ system
viii Unfortunately data for spouses working off-farm jobs is not available for some years, although it appears to
be insignificant in the years for which it is present - so the spouses job is not included here.
ix It is possible to also include renting-out land as an alternative. However in the literature the most common
approach is to estimate separate models for renting-in and renting-out. Since we are primarily concerned
with the effects of neglecting unobserved heterogeneity and state-dependence, we focus on the binary
choice: rent-in/don’t rent-in.
x Where Y
it
=1 represents a choice to participate in the market by renting in land.
xi Tax regimes etc. may differ across regions while being constant within them.
xii Many of the considered studies do include regional dummies.
xiii This parameter captures unobserved heterogeneity.
xiv Heckman 1981b discusses the incidental parameters problem.
xv A transformation such as differencing or demeaning is sufficient in a linear setting.
xvi We find the likelihood for an individual conditional on the unobserved individual effect and then integrate
over the range of unobserved effects to get the individual likelihood function.
xvii Yao does not estimate models for the extent of particaption.
xviii Since the time-invariant heterogeneity in this period also influenced the previous participation decision.
xix Bartolucci and Nigro (2007) have also shown that a dynamic fixed effect logit model can be approximated
by a quadratic exponential model.
xx Holden and Ghebru (2005) appears to use data from a separate sampling period and is not directly
comparable
xxi Hoetker (2007) suggests two approaches to making comparisons across groups. Firstly, we can consider
differences in the sign and significance of variables. Alternatively, we may consider differences in the ratio
coefficients, so that the unknown confounding term cancels out
α
r
α
s
=
β
r
σ
ε
/
β
s
σ
ε
=
β
r
β
s
.
xxii The coefficients are also available from the authors.
xxiii Similar results for the other systems can be obtained form the authors - though in some cases convergence
is not acheived, in part this may be due to the smaller sample sizes involved.
xxiv To make valid comparisons, coefficients should be scaled by 1−Ȳ) to correct for difference in the 
variance of μ
xxv Tables 7 presents the coefficients for the probit model, while Table 8 presents the APEs. However, since
the scale of the variance may differ across systems and is unidentified, some caution is warranted when
considering the probit results. Thus we focus instead on the tobit results.
